**Your Supabase Is Public**
As a journalist, I've come across many stories of security vulnerabilities in popular software as a service (SaaS) platforms. But none as disturbing as the one I'm about to share with you. Recently, while chatting with a friend who's developing his own SaaS project using Supabase, I stumbled upon a glaring security issue that left me questioning the security measures implemented by this rapidly growing platform.
**The Incident**
My friend sent me a link to his new project, and as is my habit when exploring new tech, I decided to take a peek under the hood. Using a simple `curl` request, I was able to access the Supabase URL and anonymous key (anon key) that my friend had conveniently left unprotected. This, unfortunately, is not an isolated incident. In fact, it's become a regular occurrence for me when working with Supabase.
**The Problem**
Supabase's anon key is designed to be public, allowing users to access the platform without requiring authentication. However, this feature can quickly turn into a liability if not implemented correctly. What I discovered was that my friend had created an additional public users table and failed to set proper row-level security (RLS) measures in place. This meant that anyone with access to the anon key could view sensitive information stored in this table.
**The Consequences**
In this case, the damage was limited to accessing user data such as names, nicknames, emails, and even passwords hashed using a weak algorithm. However, I've seen cases where exposure of sensitive data can have far more severe consequences, including compromising entire databases. This raises concerns about the security posture of Supabase users who are creating public-facing applications without proper RLS measures in place.
**The Blame Game**
While it's tempting to attribute this issue to the "vibe-coding wave" that has swept the industry, I believe a more significant contributor is Supabase itself. With over 100,000 projects created daily on platforms like Lovable, which also uses Supabase, how many of these users are making the same mistake? Instead of relying on user diligence and security awareness, perhaps it's time for Supabase to take a proactive approach in preventing this type of vulnerability.
**A Comparison with Pocketbase**
I was impressed by Pocketbase, another database platform that handles RLS differently. It includes a default `_pb_users_auth_` collection that can be easily extended with new fields and comes with proper access control checks out-of-the-box. To make it insecure, you'd need to intentionally configure it incorrectly. This raises questions about whether Supabase's ease of use is being prioritized over security.
**Conclusion**
As I conclude this article, I'm left wondering how many users have inadvertently exposed their databases due to the same vulnerability. While it's easy to point fingers at user error or the "vibe-coding wave," I believe a more responsible approach would be for Supabase to take steps to prevent this issue. Perhaps it's time to rethink the design of public-facing applications and prioritize security from the outset.
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